This paper focuses on learning the economic behaviour of the access point (AP) and users in wireless local area networks (WLANs), and using a game theoretic approach to analyze the interactions among them. Recent studies have shown that the AP would adopt a simple, yet optimal, fixed rate pricing strategy when the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited. However, the fixed rate strategy fails to be optimal if a more realistic model with limited capacity is considered. A substitute pricing scheme for access service provisioning is hence proposed. In particular, the AP first estimates the probable utility degradation of existing users consequent upon the admission of an incoming user. Second, the AP decides: (i) whether the incoming user should be accepted; and (ii) the price to be announced in order to try to maximize the overall revenue. The condition, under which the proposed scheme results in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), is investigated.
Introduction
In recent years, WLANs are being rapidly deployed all over the world. In dense metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, there is sufficient density of APs to provide citywide ubiquitous wireless access [1] . However, due to the increased traffic load and security risk, owners of private WLANs (hereafter termed AP owner) will not provide public access unless adequately compensated.
Note that a compensation mechanism itself could not eliminate the security risk. However, it is believed that monetary cost and authentication (if required) would prevent users from doing malicious acts at will. On the other hand, in order to get a return on investment, AP owners would run the risk of sharing their private WLANs with the public [2] .
Generally, there are two types of approaches to compensate AP owners: centralized approach [2] -[5] and decentralized approach [6] - [8] . In the centralized approach, a third-party server is deployed to receive and process the service requests from users; while in the decentralized apManuscript received August 7, 2012 . Manuscript revised February 24, 2013. † The authors are with the Global Information and Telecommunication Institute, Waseda University, Tokyo, 169-0051 Japan.
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There are a number of benefits in using the centralized approach. Since a third-party server maintains the system state for all APs in a federated network, such as Boingo [5] , it can monitor and control the use of the wireless bandwidth in the federated network. Global knowledge of the system state enables the server to easily identify heavily loaded APs and hence distribute users from a heavily loaded AP to a lightly loaded one.
The decentralized approach has its advantages as well. First, as the pricing process can be done in AP locally, there is no need for the AP to carry the user's traffic into the wired network for negotiation. This stops all unauthenticated traffic at the edge of the wired network and is thus a relatively low-risk design. Second, decentralization transfers decision-making processes to individual APs, thus reducing network management overhead and considerably increasing network scalability [9] .
In this paper, we put our focus on studying the properties of the decentralized approach. Without a third-party server, the user and the private AP may not know each other's identity, and may not be able to trust each other to carry out the transaction on each side. For example, a malicious AP might accept payment and then reject to deliver service when the user pays the AP in advance; on the other hand, a user may fail to make a promised payment after receiving service. Therefore, we must take care to structure the game in a way that prevent players from cheating. One possible way would be for the user to pay the AP in small amounts over the duration of the session [10] .
Many studies have focused on using pricing as an incentive mechanism to encourage AP owners to share their private WLANs with the public, where the overall payment charged grows with the time connected [7] , [8] , [11] . In [7] , authors investigate the economic behaviour of wireless users under an assumption that the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited. They prove that fixed rate is an optimal strategy to the wireless AP, given that users have a so-called "web browsing" utility function. The "web browsing" utility grows proportionally with the time slots he gains access initially, and saturates when he no longer intends to browse. In [8] , authors think that it is only a special case that the WLAN has unlimited capacity, or equivalently, has an adequate supply of bandwidth to meet all demands from users. So the authors generalize the model in [7] by limiting the AP to admit at most m > 0 users at a time, and show that Copyright c 2013 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers the elegant results in the unlimited capacity model (charging a fixed rate at all time) no longer apply. They propose an algorithm based on the Markovian decision theory [12] to devise the optimal pricing strategy.
We argue that the utility degradation of existing users, incurred by the admission of an incoming user, is not sufficiently considered in [7] , [8] . Although limiting the AP to admit at most m > 0 users at a time [8] is more realistic, we argue that the limitation is a little bit strong. Actually, if the admission of the incoming "m + 1"-th user would increase her overall revenue, there is no reason to think that the AP will reject the incoming user.
Connection admission control (CAC) is an important component for the provision of guaranteed QoS [13] - [15] . The purpose of CAC is to limit the amount of traffic admitted into a particular service class so that the level of QoS guarantee of the existing users will not be degraded, while at the same time the medium resources can be efficiently utilized.
In this paper, we relax the limitation that the AP admits at most m users at a time, and use a game theoretic approach to study the interactions among the AP and users. The AP first estimates the probable utility degradation of existing users consequent upon the admission of an incoming user. Second, the AP decides: (i) whether the incoming user should be accepted; (ii) the price to be announced in order to try to maximize her revenue.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss related results in [7] , forming the basis of our work. In Sect. 3, we present the necessary modifications to the original unlimited model and transform it into the limited version, showing that the previous equilibrium in [7] no longer holds. In Sect. 4, we describe the pricing and the CAC policy. In Sect. 5, we propose an algorithm to obtain the optimal strategies for both the wireless AP and users with incomplete information. In Sect. 6, we have a closedform solution for the optimal rate to be charged. In Sect. 7, we show the simulation results. In Sect. 7, we conclude this paper.
Related Work and Background
The seminal work by Musacchio and Walrand [7] presents the economic behaviour of wireless users under a specific network topology. In particular, they prove that fixed rate pricing is optimal to the wireless AP, given that users have the "web browsing" utility function.
The model adopted by [7] is termed unlimited model. The formulation of the unlimited model relies on a strong assumption that the AP has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is unlimited.
As shown in Fig. 1 , the interactions among the AP and the multiple users are analyzed using a two-player game. Time is divided into slots. At the beginning of time slot t, a user sends a connection request over the slot. The AP replies with a slot price p t . The user then chooses to accept the slot price and connect, or to reject and leave. The game ends: (i) when the user finds the slot price is too high to accept; or (ii) when the user does not intend to connect any more.
After the session of service, the user's web browsing utility is:
where
• T is the number of time slots the user has connected;
• τ is a discrete random variable representing the number of time slots the user intended to connect and browse the web; • U is a continuous random variable representing the user's utility of gaining Internet access in one time slot. The value of U is assumed to be fixed for that user during the service session.
Upon the end of the game, the user has a net payoff of
p t , while the AP has a revenue of T t=1 p t . Authors in [7] prove that the following strategy profile is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) [16] :
1. The user accepts the price and connects or remains connected in slot t if t < τ and p t ≤ U, otherwise the user rejects the price and leaves. (This is referred to as the myopic strategy.) 2. The AP charges a non-decreasing price sequence p t such that
The set of maximizers of pP(U ≥ p) is denoted by arg max p pP(U ≥ p). Note that the AP charges a fixed price sequence, since the expression pP(U ≥ p) is maximized by a single price, which does not vary over time slots.
A PBE is simply a set of strategies and beliefs such that, at any stage of the game, the strategies are optimal under the given beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategies and observed actions. Namely, no player can increase the expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from the PBE strategy at any point in the game.
Limited-Capacity Model
The model we are envisioning assumes that each user communicates with a single AP directly. To maximize the system capacity and keep the interference to a minimum, neighboring APs (if exist) are configured to operate on different RF channels.
In order to clarify the relationship between the utility and the number of users associated with the AP, we turn to describe the 802.11 MAC layer protocol [17] - [20] and main characteristics of the wireless channel. The IEEE 802.11 WLAN specifies two medium access control mechanisms, i.e., distributed coordination function (DCF) and point coordination function (PCF) [21] . The basic access method in the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol is DCF, which is based on carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA). The other optional access method called PCF is only usable in infrastructure network configurations and is not supported in most of the current wireless cards. In this paper, we thus focus on 802.11 DCF.
Each AP and the associated wireless users utilize only a single RF channel and use it as a shared spectrum resource. The spectrum is unlicensed and an unlimited number of users can share the spectrum with usage rights governed by technical standards. The CSMA/CA protocol, which is used for resolving contention among multiple users accessing the channel, allows wireless users to contend for transmission [21] . When two or more users want to transmit a packet at the same time, the packets collide and are lost; such packets become backlogged and must be retransmitted at a later time.
It has been shown experimentally and analytically that as the number of users associated with the AP increases, such random access networks lead to a degradation in QoS metrics including throughput, delay and packet loss rate [22] - [25] . The utility of having Internet access consequently decreases with the number of associated users increasing.
User i's valuation of the access service is characterized by a utility U n i , where n is the number of users associated with the AP. To focus on modeling, U n i is given as follows.
Here θ i is a user-dependent scale factor and can be thought of as a parameter representing the priority of user i's willingness to pay, also referred to as the utility rate. f (.) is a decreasing function of n. Our approach can also be applicable to more complex utility models which take into account the dynamics of the wireless environment, but we leave these extensions for future work.
In summary, our model differs from the unlimited model in two ways: (i) the AP has an limited uplink bandwidth to the Internet and the channel capacity of WLAN is limited; and (ii) as shown in Eq. (2), the utility of each user varies as a function of the number of users associated with the AP. Figure 2 depicts this scenario.
Lemma 1. Considering users with utility defined by Eq. (2), it is no longer a PBE for the provider to charge all the users with a fixed price per unit time.
Proof. We assume that there are n t users associated in time slot t, and n t+1 in time slot t + 1 (n t n t+1 ). Therefore, 
Pricing and Connection Admission Control
Time is also divided into discrete slots or "periods". All users keep accurate common time (there exists a global clock or time synchronization mechanism). Each user pays the AP in small payments over the course of the session.
During the session of service, although the AP would wish to cease service to users or increase the price over time to obtain higher revenue, it is reasonable to believe that users will be discouraged from buying such a kind of service since the break of service might disturb users' applications, and it is unrealistic to require users to monitor the varying price continuously [8] . Therefore, we assume that the AP cannot change the price during the session of service, and that the AP cannot suspend the service as long as the user can keep paying, while the user can disconnect voluntarily. The contract between an AP and a user is described as follows.
1. The AP provides access service for the user until the user voluntarily disconnects; 2. The user pays a price for the obtained service. The total payment is the price times the duration of the service.
Note that the AP is allowed to announce different prices to different users, but once announced, the rate cannot be changed over the duration of the session.
The pricing and CAC processes are executed one user after another according to their arrival time. Users are named according to their arrival order.
As shown in Fig. 3 , an incoming user tries to begin a session by initially sending a connection request to the AP. The AP, who receives the request, decides whether the incoming user should be accepted. Intuitively, when the WLAN is overloaded, the AP rejects the connection request. Otherwise, the AP accepts the connection request and announces a slot price to try to maximize the overall revenue. On the other hand, at the beginning of each time slot, the user chooses to accept the slot price and connect (or keep connecting) to the AP, or to reject and leave. The game ends at the first time the user rejects the AP's proposal.
Non-cooperative Game and Revenue Maximization
Under the limited-capacity model, the utility of having In- ternet access decreases with the number of users associated with the AP increasing. In case that the utility decreases below the price charged, the existing users may reject the price and leave. The disconnections of existing users incur revenue loss. This imposes the AP owner a capacity constraint on her revenue maximization problem.
Therefore, to try to maximize her overall revenue, the AP has to decide the price for the incoming user based on not only the revenue growth from the admission of an incoming user, but also the potential revenue loss incurred by the disconnections of existing users. To be precisely, the revenue growth from the incoming user should at least compensate for the revenue loss incurred by the disconnections of existing users. Otherwise, the AP should reject the connection request.
Let n t (n 1 = 0) represent the number of users that keep connected at the beginning of time slot t. Let m t (m 1 = 0) represent the overall number of admitted users before time slot t. Furthermore, let Δn t be the number of users that are newly admitted in time slot t. Obviously, m t+1 equals to m t + Δn t .
In order to more carefully examine the notion of incentives in the WLANs described above, we formulate the access sharing problem as a multi-stage non-cooperative game, where the players of the game are the AP and users. As depicted in Fig. 4 , a pure strategy for the AP can be specified by a sequence of non-negative prices
) exactly, the AP has to induce the type-information based on the history of users' choices. For instance, whenever a myopic user i accepts the price p i while the number of users associated with the AP is n, the AP can confine θ i by lower bounding it with p i / f (n), i.e., the AP believes that user i would definitely accept the price p i once the number of users associated with the AP is less than n. 
subject to
• p m t +k is the price for the "k"-th incoming user in slot t;
• P(U n t +k m t +k > p) is the probability that the utility of gaining access is higher than the rate p;
• for any p ∈ R + , the set of maximizers of P(U Proof. Please refer to Appendix A for the details of proof.
Lemma 2 suggests that an AP should pick an optimal price to gain as much as possible from an incoming user (i.e., Eq. (3)), while checking whether the revenue growth from the incoming user can compensate for the revenue loss due to the disconnections of existing users (i.e., Eq. (4)).
When the expected revenue growth from the incoming user cannot compensate for the revenue loss, the WLAN is considered to be not having enough capacity for accommodating the incoming user's service request. In this case, the WLAN is marked as overloaded. Otherwise, the AP accepts the connection request and announces a slot price to try to maximize the overall revenue.
A Closed-Form Solution
In this section, as an instance we investigate a solution for the optimal rate to be charged. For simple calculations, it is assumed that user i's utility rate θ i has uniform distribution on an interval [a,b], and U n i = θ i /n. Furthermore, it is assumed that user i stays for a time which is exponentially distributed.
The objective function L(p) in Eq. (3) is defined as follows.
To obtain the maximum of L(p), we take the derivative of L(p) with respect to p and let it equal to 0, i.e., L (p) = 0. We have p = b 2(n t +k) . Furthermore, if taking the second derivative of L(p) with respect to p, we get L (p) < 0, which suggests that the function is concave down at p. Thus, in order to try to maximize L(p), the AP charges user m t + k with the following rate:
According to Lemma 2, the complementary condition Eq. (4) should be satisfied in order to try to maximize the overall revenue. Here, Eq. (4) can be transformed into the following expression:
Note that τ 1 i − τ 0 i represents the stay duration of user i, which is assumed to be exponentially distributed. Using the memorylessness property of exponential distribution, we have
Equation (7) can therefore be transformed into Eq. (9).
A binary indicator x i,t is defined as follows.
Then Eq. (9) is transformed into Eq. (11).
When the complementary condition Eq. (11) is not tenable, i.e., the revenue growth from the incoming user is not enough to compensate for the revenue loss due to the utility degradation of existing users, the AP rejects the connection; otherwise, the AP announces a price according to Eq. (6).
According to Eq. (6), the AP would decrease the price when the WLAN is heavily loaded, and increase the price when the network is lightly loaded. Existing users may monitor the varying price dynamically, and deliberately adopt the "disconnection-and-renegotiation" strategy in order to gain a lower price. However, we believe that the interrupted access service as well as the risk of being rejected in renegotiation process would prevent the existing users from being a speculator. For the anti-speculator issues, it is out of the scope of this paper, and we treat it as our future work.
Evaluation Scenario and Simulation Results
For experimental evaluation, we construct a model of a public-area WLAN using Microsoft Visual Studio 2010, where users arrive according to a Poisson process at rate λ per hour, and stay for a time which is exponentially distributed with an average time of γ hours. The load of users' requests is therefore set to γ × λ. Furthermore, let θ i be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 200] . The length of a slot is set to 0.5 hour. Each round of simulation lasts 24 hours, and is repeated for 10000 times. The detailed simulation settings are summarized as shown in Table 1 .
The curves in Fig. 5(a) , show the blocking probability as a function of the number of users associated with the AP and the average congestion tolerance of existing users. On the other hand, the curves in Fig. 5(b) , show the blocking probability as a function of the average price and the average congestion tolerance of existing users. Specifically, the arrival rate here is set to 15 per hour, and the average stay duration is set to 1 hour. It can be observed that • the less the number of users associated with the AP is, the lower probability with which the AP blocks the new connection; • the higher congestion tolerance the existing users have, the lower probability with which the AP blocks the new connection; and • the lower price the existing users are bound with, the lower probability with which the AP blocks the new connection.
The overall revenues (R overall ) with different γ and λ are shown in Fig. 6(a) . When γ is set to 0.5 hour, an interesting phenomenon is that R overall increases with respect to λ, for λ varies from 1 to 5 per hour; and decreases with respect to λ, for λ varies from 5 to 20 per hour.
As described in Sect. 5, users' utility of having Internet access decreases with the number of users associated with the AP increasing. In case that the utility decreases below the price charged, the existing users may reject the price and leave. The disconnections of existing users incur revenue loss. This imposes the AP owner a capacity constraint on her revenue maximization problem.
Generally speaking, R overall of the proposed scheme depends on three factors: (i) the overall number of users associated with the AP (n overall ); (ii) the average price charged on the users (p average ); and (iii) the average stay duration of the users (Δτ average ). With the increasing of λ, more and more incoming users with high utility rates choose to accept the price and connect, while more and more existing users with low priority of willingness to pay cannot endure the congestion and start to quit the service initiatively. As shown in Figs. 6(b) , (c) and (d), it could be concluded that:
• n overall increases with respect to λ;
• p average decreases with respect to the number of existing users, according to Eq. (6); hence, p average decreases with respect to λ and • Δτ average decreases with respect to λ as well, due to the disconnections of existing users. When γ is set to 0.5 hour and λ is below 5 per hour, the AP is relatively lightly-loaded, and only a small part of users quit initiatively. As shown in Fig. 6(b) , n overall increases linearly with respect to λ, and becomes the dominant factor that determines R overall . Therefore, R overall of the proposed scheme increases with respect to λ.
When γ is set to 0.5 hour and λ is above 5 per hour, the AP is relatively heavily-loaded. Although AP can keep on accepting incoming users, existing users may quit due to the congestion and degradation in QoS provided. n overall reaches its saturation condition gradually, and is no longer the dominant factor that determines the overall revenue. Instead, p average and Δτ average which decrease with respect to λ become the dominant factors. Therefore, R overall of the proposed scheme decreases with respect to λ.
In order to explore the effect of the proposed algorithm on increasing AP's revenue, we use the fixed rate scheme which offers little CAC for comparison. In particular, the fixed rate is set to 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90, respectively. The main distinction between the two schemes is that: the proposed scheme examines the potential revenue loss before accepting an incoming user, while the other one accepts all users straightforwardly.
The curves, plotted in Fig. 7 , show that the proposed algorithm outperforms its counterpart in terms of increasing AP's revenue under various simulation settings, especially when the load of users' requests, i.e., γ × λ, is relatively light. As shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , the improvement in Δτ average contributes most to the overall revenue gain.
Different from the proposed scheme, since a fixed price is charged, R overall of the fixed rate scheme depends on two factors only: n overall and Δτ average . As shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , it could be concluded that:
• n overall increases with respect to λ; and • Δτ average decreases with respect to λ.
When λ is increased above 5 per hour, the determining factors n overall and Δτ average begin to level off. Therefore, R overall of the fixed rate scheme converges at a certain value as well.
For the fixed rate scheme using prices of 10 and 30, n overall increases sharply, while for the fixed rate scheme using prices of 50, 70 and 90, n overall increases, albeit gradually, as λ is increased from 1 to 5 per hour. In Fig. 7(a) , for the fixed rate scheme using prices of 10 and 30, since the gain in n overall is enough to compensate the loss in Δτ average , R overall increases with respect to λ, as λ is increased from 1 to 5 per hour. On the other hand, for the fixed rate scheme using prices of 50, 70 and 90, since the gain in n overall is not enough to compensate the loss in Δτ average , R overall decreases with respect to λ, as λ is increased from 1 to 5 per hour.
Another interesting phenomenon is that R overall can be completely different even if the load of users' requests is the same. For example, the load of users' requests for λ of 20 in Fig. 7(a) and that for λ of 10 in Fig. 7(b) are the same. However, take the fixed rate scheme using the price of 30 as an example, R overall in Fig. 7(a) is approximately half of that in Fig. 7(b) . That is not surprising because, with the dynamic connections and disconnections of users, the load of users' requests cannot reflect the offered traffic exactly. If we omit the difference in the amount of load per unit time contributed by each user, the actual offered traffic (L overall ) could be denoted as follows:
L overall for λ of 20 in Fig. 7 (a) (33.1 hours) is approximately half of that for λ of 10 in Fig. 7 (b) (58.3 hours).
When γ is set to 1.5 hours, the difference between the convergence point of L overall for the fixed rate scheme using price 50 and that for the fixed rate scheme using price 90 is 17.2 hours. When γ is set to 0.5 hour, the difference between the convergence point of L overall for the fixed rate scheme using price 50 and that for the fixed rate scheme using price 90 is 9.41 hours. The difference between the convergence point of R overall for the fixed rate scheme using price 50 and that for the fixed rate scheme using price 90 in Fig. 7(c) is further enlarged (i.e., multiplied by the corresponding fixed rate) compared with that in Fig. 7(a) .
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a distributed pricing scheme in conjunction with a CAC policy for revenue maximization in WLANs. First, we modelled the interactions among the AP and wireless users as a multi-stage non-cooperative game. We then studied the stability of the proposed scheme in terms of convergence to a PBE. In the PBE, the AP cannot increase the revenue by unilaterally deviating from the PBE strategy at any point in the game. Simulation results have revealed that the proposed scheme outperforms the conventional fixed rate pricing scheme in terms of increasing AP's revenue.
Several assumptions made in our approach may be considered unrealistic. It is worth pointing out that the main scope of this paper is to demonstrate the feasibility of a distributed CAC policy. The description of a realistic implementation is beyond the scope of this paper and represents the next step of this research activity.
Furthermore, the analysis in this paper focuses on the access network merely. The core network may not accept the access sharing, due to the increasing traffic load on the core network. We argue that the revenue distribution between the access network and the core network can be a key to address this kind of problem. Since the revenue distribution does not change the game modeling of this paper, the analysis and corresponding results can be easily extended to the model including the core network. 
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2
We prove Lemma 2 by verifying that the strategy profiles remain the best responses to each other in any continuation game, beginning from an arbitrary slot t as follows.
Proof. First, we find the AP's optimal counter strategy to a user playing the myopic strategy. A pure strategy for the AP can be specified by a sequence of non-negative prices
to charge the "i"-th incoming user. The AP chooses her sequence of prices to try to maximize her overall revenue, i.e.,
), as shown in the Eq. (A· 1):
> p i ) is the probability that the existing user i keeps connected in time slot t, under the condition that the user i chooses to keep connected when the network gets the most congested after his connection; Now looking at the user's side, it is not difficult to notice that the myopic strategy is the best response to an AP. As incoming users connect, each existing user's utility decreases consequently. Once the utility decreases below the price charged, without the voluntary disconnections of other users, the user should never expect that his negativepayoff condition could take a favorable turn in the next time slot.
